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Is the Punishment More Certain? An
Analysis of CCTV Detections and
Enforcement
Eric L. Piza, Joel M. Caplan and Leslie W.
Kennedy
The primary preventive mechanism of CCTV is considered to be deterrence.
However, the relationship between CCTV and deterrence has been left impli-
cit. Empirical research has yet to directly test whether CCTV increases the
certainty of punishment, a key component of the deterrence doctrine. This
study analyzes CCTV’s relation to punishment certainty in Newark, NJ. Across
eight crime categories, CCTV and 9-1-1 calls-for-service case processing times
and enforcement rates are compared through Mann-Whitney U and Fisher’s
Exact tests, respectively, with a Holm-Bonferroni procedure correcting for
multiple comparisons. ANOVA and negative binomial regression models further
analyze the frequency of CCTV activity and the impact of various factors on
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the (downward) trend of detections and enforcement. Findings suggest that
CCTV increases punishment certainty on a case-by-case basis. However, a
reduction of CCTV activity caused by specific “surveillance barriers” likely
minimized the effect of the enhanced enforcement.
Keywords CCTV; deterrence; police response; Holm-Bonferroni correction;
negative binomial regression
Introduction
While scholars have offered a wide range of mechanisms by which CCTV may
prevent crime (Gill & Spriggs, 2005; Pawson & Tilley, 1994), the practical appli-
cation of CCTV predominately relates to deterrence (Farrington, Gill, Waples,
& Argomaniz, 2007; Ratcliffe, 2006). This perceived mechanism is reflected in
the literature, with most evaluations exclusively testing CCTV’s deterrent
effect though “pre” and “post” tests of crime in target areas (see Gill & Spri-
ggs, 2005; La Vigne, Lowry, Markman, & Dwyer, 2011 for noteworthy excep-
tions). Little thought has been given to precisely how CCTV can generate
deterrence. It is implicitly assumed that the simple presence of cameras is suf-
ficient to deter offenders. However, empirical findings from the deterrence lit-
erature put this assumption in doubt. Firstly, perceived certainty of punishment
is a key ingredient in producing deterrence (Durlauf & Nagin, 2011). Secondly,
experience with punishment results in offenders’ adjusting their perception of
punishment certainty upward (Apel, 2012; Piquero & Pogarsky, 2002). These
findings suggest that CCTV’s deterrent effects go beyond camera presence and
are related to its ability to generate increased law enforcement actions in tar-
get areas, thus increasing offenders’ perceived certainty of punishment. While
recent reports have noted that systems that are most effective are often highly
integrated into police functions (Cameron, Kolodinski, May, & Williams, 2008;
La Vigne & Lowry, 2011; La Vigne et al., 2011) research has yet to directly test
CCTV’s effect on actual certainty of punishment.
The current study addresses this relationship. CCTV detections and 9-1-1 calls-
for-service (CFS) occurring over a three-year period in Newark, NJ are compared
on case processing times and closure rates (e.g. whether the incident resulted in
a police enforcement action). In addition, we examine the frequency of CCTV
activity and the impact of various factors on its (downward) linear trend. Our
findings support the notion that CCTV increases punishment certainty on a case-
by-case basis, with CCTV-reported incidents more often resulting in case closure
via police enforcement than CFS. A drastic reduction of surveillance activity
caused by specific “surveillance barriers”——namely, the rapid installation of
cameras absent an increase in personnel——likely compromised the benefits of
the enhanced enforcement. Specifically, the infrequent occurrence of CCTV
activity likely prevented the “certainty of punishment” from being translated










































into offender knowledge or “word on the street.” The paper concludes with a
discussion of the policy implications of these findings. We begin with a review of
the literature that provides a conceptual framework for this study.
Review of Relevant Literature
CCTV, Apprehension, and Deterrence
Theoretical perspectives of surveillance are rooted in the rational choice
perspective of criminality (Cornish & Clarke, 1986). Whereas deterministic
theories view crime as an inevitable byproduct of social ills, rational choice
considers crime as “purposive behavior designed to meet the offender’s com-
monplace needs” (Clarke, 1997, pp. 9, 10). Under this perspective, offenders
decide whether or not to offend on a case-by-case basis. While these decisions
often occur in a state of “bounded rationality” constrained by the limits of
time and information (Clarke & Cornish, 1985), the offender nonetheless ratio-
nally ponders the situation at hand. The decision to offend is “the outcome of
an appraisal process which … evaluates the relative merits of a range of poten-
tial courses of action, comprising all those thought likely in the offender’s
view to achieve his or her current objective” (Cornish & Clarke, 1987, p. 935).
As per the rational choice doctrine, CCTV presence must communicate that
crime commission poses an increased level of risk to offenders in target areas
for deterrence to be achieved. While one may intuitively consider the risk of
apprehension to be heightened in the presence of cameras, the actions of
offenders suggest that such cognitive processes are not automatic. Numerous
studies have documented offender willingness to operate illegally in sight of
CCTV (Butler, 1994; Ditton & Short 1998; Gill & Turbin 1998). During interviews
with prisoners, Gill and Loveday (2003) found that most offenders did not con-
sider surveillance cameras as a serious threat. This disregard for CCTV was
related to the fact that the presence of a camera did not guarantee that
criminal infractions would result in enforcement. As noted by Gill and Loveday
(p. 19), “offenders appear to believe that the notification of an incident [via
CCTV] carries no guarantee that the police are able to respond quickly.”
However, while most offenders did not worry about CCTV when planning and
committing their offenses, prisoners previously caught or convicted through
CCTV footage were significantly more likely to report that surveillance cameras
increase the likelihood of apprehension. Indeed, Gill and Loveday (2003)
observed that the offenders were more concerned with police presence and
the ability of the police to respond to crime observed on camera than the
cameras themselves.
The findings of Gill and Loveday (2003) have significant implications for the
use of CCTV by suggesting that the mere presence of a camera does not gener-
ate deterrence unless it is known to be accompanied by a real threat of appre-
hension. Previous research supports this proposition. While early deterrence
research was described in terms of an offenders’ “perception” of punishment,










































contemporary research supports Paternoster’s (1987) notion of the “experien-
tial effect,” which he describes as “the effect of prior behavior on currently
held perceptions” (p. 173). As argued by Apel (2012, p. 6),
individuals who commit crime and “get away with it” by avoiding punish-
ment might be expected to “update” their risk perceptions; specifically, by
adjusting them downward. One the other hand, individuals who commit
crime and are apprehended might realize that they were overly optimistic
about the true likelihood of apprehension and, therefore, update their risk
perceptions upward.
Clarke and Cornish (1985) similarly note that a successful crime act provides
an offender “direct knowledge about the consequences and implications of
that behavior,” which becomes “much more salient to future decisions about
continuance or desistance” (p. 164).
These examples illustrate the importance of punishment in high-visibility
policing efforts, such as CCTV. Sherman (1990) noted that offenders often
learn “through trial and error that they had overestimated the certainty of
getting caught at the beginning of the crackdown” (p. 10). Conversely, police
can utilize enforcement actions to strategically manipulate offender risk per-
ceptions in a manner that maximizes deterrence (Nagin, 1998). The effect of
sanction is not limited to the specific offender subjected to enforcement, but
rather influences the general population as potential offenders learn from
acquaintances that the risk of punishment has increased (Cook, 1980; Cusson,
1993). Enforcement need not be particularly severe to have such an effect.
For example, Durlauf and Nagin (2011) discussed Hawaii’s Project Hope (Haw-
ken & Kleiman, 2009) and a randomized experiment conducted by Weisburd,
Einat, and Kowalski (2008). Both projects utilized short, but highly certain, jail
sentences to produce deterrence. While the punishments were relatively
minor, Weisburd et al. (2008) and Hawken and Kleiman (2009) observed a sig-
nificant reduction in failures of defendants to pay court-ordered fines and rates
of positive drug tests, missed appointments, and arrests in probationers,
respectively.
Recent research suggests such a relationship between enforcement and
deterrence in respect to CCTV. Discussing San Francisco’s CCTV system, a
police officer was quoted as saying
when the type of stuff that they’re (offenders) involved in kept happening
and they realized they weren’t getting arrested, nothing was happening
because of those cameras. I don’t think (the camera program) works as a
deterrent at all … because there’s no immediate consequence to the behav-
ior. (King, Mulligan, & Raphael, 2008, p. 87)
In their study of surveillance systems in three US cities, the Urban Institute (La
Vigne et al., 2011) found the systems that effectively reduced crime were
those which were actively monitored and heavily incorporated into the police










































function. Similarly, La Vigne and Lowry’s (2011) analysis of photographic
cameras1 in commuter parking lots found no effect on crime reduction, which
they attributed to budget cuts preventing police from integrating the cameras
into law enforcement activities. These studies are further supported by
research that found passive CCTV systems, which incorporate no active moni-
toring, to have little effect on crime (King et al., 2008).
The Practical Application of CCTV and Surveillance Barriers
Despite the assumption that CCTV cameras increase the certainty of punish-
ment, the practical application of CCTV may negatively affect an operator’s
ability to detect incidents of concern. For example, despite most documented
cases of police-operated CCTV systems reporting that operators are given the
primary responsibility of proactively monitoring cameras for the purpose of
detecting incidents of concern (Armitage, Smythe, & Pease, 1999; Caplan,
Kennedy, & Petrossian, 2011; Ditton & Short, 1999; Farrington et al., 2007; Gill
et al., 2005; Keval & Sasse, 2010; Norris & Armstrong, 1999a, 1999b; Norris &
McCahill, 2006; Ratcliffe, Taniguchi, & Taylor, 2009; Smith, 2004), the detec-
tion of criminal events by CCTV operators is rare (Norris & Armstrong, 1999a,
1999b). Ditton and Short (1999) found that operator activity led to only one
arrest per 967 h of monitoring in two Scottish city centers while Sarno, Hough,
and Bulos (1999) reported that a London CCTV unit provided police with foot-
age of crime incidents a mere eight times over a 12-month period. General
monitoring activity of surveillance operators (as opposed to enforcement activ-
ity) is similarly low. Over 592 h, Norris and Armstrong (1999a) documented 888
targeted surveillances, which they defined as an operator observation “that
lasted more than one minute on an individual or group of individuals, or where
the surveillance was initiated from outside the system, for example, by police
or private security” (p. 161); this translates to a rate of 1.5 targeted surveil-
lances per hour of proactive monitoring. Norris and McCahill (2006) found simi-
larly low levels of operator activity, with operator-generated surveillances
occurring only once every 4 h across four CCTV systems in Britain (p. 108).
This lack of proactive CCTV activity can be explained by factors common to
police-led CCTV operations, which we term “surveillance barriers.” For one,
the size of many surveillance systems places a heavy burden on camera opera-
tors. Norris and Armstrong (1999a) estimated that the 20 cameras in a British
surveillance system created over 43 million unique “images” on a daily basis
(p. 159). This issue is obviously compounded when CCTV systems include a
much larger number of cameras, which appears to be the norm (Farrington
et al., 2007). A high camera-to-operator ratio has the predictable result of
1. While this analysis was of photographic cameras, rather than video (CCTV) cameras, the goal of
the program was similar to most CCTV programs; deterrence of offenders through the conspicuous
presence of recording technology. Therefore, the implications of this study relate to the use of
CCTV as well as photographic cameras.










































crime occurring within sight of a camera going undetected. The following
quote from a CCTV operator adds perspective: “I cannot tell you how many
things we’ve missed when we have not been watching the other screens.
Break-ins, assaults and car thefts have been going on whilst we’ve been
operating the other cameras” (Smith, 2004, p. 385). Certain offenders are
cognizant of this fact, with Gill and Loveday (2003) quoting a prisoner as
saying “We’ve got so many cameras man, they cannot all be watched. They
have to find you, guess what you’re going to do and then do something about
it” (p. 19).
In addition to the large numbers of cameras typically present in CCTV sys-
tems, operators often have additional duties that can take them away from
their proactive monitoring function. Tasks unrelated to surveillance, such as
answering phones or manning front desks, can limit the proactive surveillance
activity of an operator (Leman-Langlois, 2002). Even tasks related to other
aspects of CCTV, such as burning footage onto disk, can impede upon active
camera monitoring. King et al. (2008) reported that burning 1 h of footage onto
disks took about 2 h in San Francisco, CA. Similarly, Gill et al. (2005) reported
that the management of footage for evidentiary purposes comprised up to 35%
of an operator’s shift in several UK systems.
Surveillance barriers may also be present in the police response to CCTV
detections. Upon detection of an incident, CCTV operators primarily report the
event via the computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system, similar to how citizen
CFS are reported to police (Law Enforcement Information Technology Stan-
dards Council [LEITSC], 2008). Police Communications systems, especially in
large urban areas, regularly experience high call volumes. Immediate dispatch
of an officer to all incidents is not a realistic nor, in certain cases, a desirable
option. It is standard procedure for requests for police service to be addressed
in a “differential response” manner, with incidents of a higher priority being
dispatched before those of lower priority. All calls awaiting dispatch are stored
in the “calls pending queue” in order of priority——from highest priority to
lowest priority (LEITSC, 2008). Consequently, while CCTV can observe crime
incidents “in-progress,” CCTV detections may face similar processing delays
as CFS. While there has yet to be a large-scale study of the process times
associated with CCTV detections, anecdotal evidence suggests that delays in
police dispatch may negatively affect CCTV operations (Gill & Hemming, 2004;
Gill et al., 2005; Lomell, 2004; Norris & Armstrong, 1999a, 1999b; Norris &
McCahill, 2006).
Scope of the Current Study
This study focused on the Newark, NJ surveillance unit’s detection of criminal
events, subsequent responses and actions taken by patrol units, and its rela-
tion to deterrence via certainty of punishment in the form of sanction by
police. Four research questions guided the analysis: (1) Are case process times










































shorter with CCTV, as compared to CFS? (2) Does CCTV produce a heightened
level of enforcement compared to CFS? (3) How often did surveillance activity
occur over the study period? and (4) What effect did various surveillance barri-
ers have on the steady reduction of surveillance activity?
Research Setting
The City of Newark, NJ has installed 146 public CCTV cameras throughout the
city. Live video footage from the cameras is monitored from a centralized
control room at the police department’s communications center. The control
room is staffed by the Newark Police Department’s Video Surveillance unit
(VSU). Two video surveillance operators under the supervision of a police ser-
geant monitor the cameras during all shifts. As per the departmental order
establishing the VSU, the primary aim of the operators is the monitoring of the
cameras for the purpose of detecting incidents of crime and disorder. Upon
detecting an incident of concern, operators report the event via the depart-
ment’s CAD system. Reported incidents (both CCTV events and 9-1-1 calls for
service) are stored in CAD’s “calls pending queue” and are addressed in a “dif-
ferential response” manner by the police dispatcher, in accordance with
accepted standards of police dispatch (LEITSC, 2008). The Newark Police
Department’s deployment policy places added priority on CCTV detections by
increasing all incidents reported via CCTV by one priority level. For example, if
a camera operator reports an incident of unverified drug activity, which has a
departmental priority code of “443,” the incident priority is upgraded to “543”
in an attempt to minimize the incident’s time in the “calls pending queue.”
Potential “surveillance barriers” identified in previous research may be pres-
ent in Newark. Given the current size of the system (146 cameras), the cam-
era-to-operator ratio is 73:1. Cameras were installed over a total of five
phases, each causing a substantial increase in the total number of cameras.2 In
addition to active monitoring, other duties are expected of the operators, par-
ticularly creating disks of footage and monitoring the department’s gunshot
detection system. Footage is needed for evidentiary purposes for each arrest
incident in which a CCTV camera provided probable cause. In addition, detec-
tives often request extended hours of footage for investigative purposes. Oper-
ators manually identify footage of concern in the CCTV software application,
export said footage to the computer hard drive, and then burn the footage on
disk. The gunshot detection system was installed in August of 2009 and is mon-
itored by the surveillance operators. While La Vigne et al. (2011) advocate the
integration of CCTV and gunshot detection technology, monitoring the system
2. Phase 1: 8 June 2007 (11 cameras installed), Phase 2: 15 March 2008 (49 cameras installed and
system size increased to 60), Phase 3: 31 July 2008 (51 cameras installed and system size increased
to 111), Phase 4: 10 December 2009 (25 cameras installed and system size increased to 136), and
Phase 5: 23 April 2010 (10 cameras installed and system size increased to 146).










































may take operators away from their active monitoring functions. When a
gunshot detection occurs, operators manually review acoustic recordings of
the gunshots to determine their validity (e.g. whether the sound was a gunshot
or other loud noise, such as a firecracker). This process can take several min-
utes to complete, an issue exacerbated by a large number of “false positives.”
Newark Police records show from 2009 through December 2010, an average of
101.5 “gun-shot detections” occurred per month. However, operators only
classified an average of 21.7 incidents per month as valid gunshots.
The Newark Police Department’s CCTV operation, and the agency as a
whole, was negatively impacted by police layoffs occurring in November 2010,
in which 13% (167 of 1,265) of police officers were terminated due to the city’s
fiscal crisis. In preparation for the layoffs, personnel in “non-essential”
assignments were often temporarily reassigned to core assignments in an
attempt to minimize overtime expenditures, a practice which began early in
2010. In the case of the surveillance unit, camera operators would occasionally
be reassigned as 9-1-1 call takers, which would leave the surveillance function
at less than full capacity.3
Data Sources and Operationalization of Key Concepts
This study focuses on the period from November 2007 through the end of
2010.4 Data for this study were compiled from the Newark Police Department’s
weekly VSU activity reports, which list all incidents that occurred in CCTV
areas of the city (both CCTV detections and 9-1-1 CFS).5 These reports contain
the following data for each incident: event number, date, time, location, inci-
dent type, the camera used to view the incident, whether it was a CCTV
detection or call-for-service, and whether an arrest occurred.
Each incident appearing on the VSU weekly activity reports was individually
referenced in the CAD system to collect additional data. Researchers first
recorded the following time variables: time of the incident (report time), time
of police dispatch, and time of officer arrival on the scene. Researchers
calculated the number of minutes and seconds between these time intervals to
create three variables: queue time (minutes between report time and dispatch
time), response time (minutes between dispatch time and arrival time), and
total process time (a sum of the previous two time intervals). Additional
information was also collected on the event disposition. While the VSU reports
3. Similar measures were taken in respect to patrol, with officers detailed to specialized footpatrol
posts being reassigned to motorized patrol, which have city-mandated minimum levels, in order to
avoid overtime expenditures (Piza & O’Hara, 2012).
4. While the CCTV operation began in June 2007, a full-time supervisor (who instituted procedures
to track the activity of the unit) was not assigned to the unit until November 2007.
5. While installed in areas throughout the city, the CCTV cameras cover a fraction of Newark’s
total geography. The CCTV viewsheds, denoting areas visible by the cameras while in panning
mode, total .57 square miles (Piza, 2012). While the cameras are able to see distances beyond
their viewsheds when manually controlled by an operator, the CCTV coverage area is a fraction of
Newark’s total geography of 26 square miles.










































identify whether or not an arrest occurred, there exists a multitude of alter-
nate event outcomes. A detection of disorderly person, for example, may be
grounds for a quality of life summons rather than an arrest. Case outcomes are
additionally influenced by officer discretion. An officer may deem an incident
undeserving of arrest (even if there are legal grounds for arrest) and decide to
issue a less punitive sanction (Bittner, 1990). Dispositions were categorized as
“arrest,” “other enforcement action,” or “no police action taken.”6
A total of 13,368 incidents are included in the weekly VSU reports and were
referenced in the aforementioned manner. Following the data collection, we
decided to exclude some incidents from the analysis based on specific criteria,
in order to strengthen the construct validity of the analysis.7 The first excluded
category was incidents with mostly predetermined outcomes. For example, a
call of a “pedestrian struck by automobile” requires the responding police offi-
cer to block-off the scene and monitor the status of the injured person until
an ambulance arrives. In this scenario, the case outcome is not likely to vary
based on the method of reporting (CCTV vs. 9-1-1). Eighteen incident types
were identified for exclusion based on this criterion.8 Likewise, incidents for
which a police response was canceled were excluded. Cancelation primarily
occurs for three reasons. One, the reporting party informs the police that a
response is no longer necessary. Two, CCTV operators notify police dispatch
that no visual evidence exists to support the complaint. For example, while a
caller may state that a large fight is occurring on a certain street corner, a
CCTV operator may report that no such incident is taking place. Thirdly, an
officer can arrive on scene and determine that no evidence exists to support
the complainant. Officer initiated incidents were excluded since the analysis
focused on the differential impact two crime-reporting methods (CCTV vs.
9-1-1) have on aspects of police response and case closure. Officer-initiated
events fall into neither of these categories, but rather represent an entirely
different method of crime discovery. Motor vehicle violations and property
crime were excluded due to their infrequent occurrence, in respect to either
CCTV or CFS. Property crimes only accounted for 16 of the 1,859 CCTV detec-
tions, which does not lend itself to reliable statistical analysis. Motor vehicle
violations (e.g. illegal parking), on the other hand, were rarely reported to
police via CFS.9 Lastly, all incidents not falling within one of the aforemen-
6. A “hierarchy rule” was applied in which researchers recorded the most punitive enforcement
action when more than 1 was enacted. For example, if a police officer issued a summons and
arrested a suspect, the disposition was recorded as an arrest.
7. Most of the excluded categories were identified through their case dispositions or incident
codes. It is noted when cases are otherwise identified for exclusion.
8. Given limited space, all of the incident types excluded from the analysis are not discussed. This
information is available from the primary author upon request.
9. Furthermore, the VSU stopped reporting motor vehicle violations after phase 1 due to concerns
that core patrol officers were too often being dispatched to low-level incidents that could be bet-
ter addressed by traffic control units.










































tioned categories were reviewed to ensure that they were reported while
“in-progress.” As noted by Eck and Spelman (1987), the ability of police to
apprehend an offender is hindered in “discovery crimes,” where a victim learns
of the crime well after its occurrence (e.g. auto theft or burglary). CCTV can
do little to generate punishment if an offender is not present. Therefore, the
incident report for each of the 8,718 incidents not excluded for one of the
aforementioned reasons was reviewed to ensure that they were reported
either during or immediately following the crime incidents. “Discovery”
incidents in which evidence of victimization surfaced an undetermined time
after crime occurrence were excluded.10
A total of 8,115 incidents remained for inclusion in the analysis: 1,385 CCTV
detections and 6,730 CFS (See Table 1). Analyses were conducted on the over-
all dataset as well as specific sub categories. Each incident was categorized as
a violent crime, disorder offense, drug offense, or “other crime.” “Disorder”
offenses included incidents commonly referred to as “social disorder” in the
literature (e.g. “disorderly persons” or “drinking in public”). No incidents of
“physical disorder,” such as graffiti or litter, appeared in the VSU reports.
“Other crime” is an official assignment code of the Newark Police Department
(NPD). According to Newark police officials, incidents should be categorized as
“other crime” only when no other code accurately reflects the incident in
question. However, officials acknowledged that both CCTV and 9-1-1 operators
often classify incidents as “other crime” when they have trouble deciding
between numerous codes. For example, the NPD utilizes two separate codes
for drug activity: a priority 5 code where visual confirmation of the offense
exists and a priority 4 code in which the activity is “unverified.” When an oper-
ator is unsure of how to classify the incident at hand, they may report it as
“other crime” to not place the incident into the wrong narcotics category.
Table 1 Final count of incidents included in the analysis
CCTV CFS Total
Overall crime 1,385 6,730 8,115
Crime type
Violence 175 3,549 3,724
Disorder offenses 631 1,383 2,014
Drug offenses 389 691 1,080
Other crime 190 1,107 1,297
Priority level
High priority 303 2,082 2,385
Intermediate priority 876 3,423 4,299
Low priority 206 1,225 1,431
10. Due to space constraints, a numerical breakdown of the excluded incident categories is not
presented but is available from the primary author upon request.










































In addition to crime type, incidents were compared across priority level,
according to NPD priority codes. As previously mentioned, the NPD upgrades
the priority code of all CCTV incidents to expedite the process times of these
incidents. For this reason, CCTV incidents may have a built-in “advantage”
over similar CFS since they may lead to a quicker police response. Therefore,
in addition to crime type, each incident was categorized as being of one of
the following priority levels: low priority, intermediate priority, or high prior-
ity.11
Research Questions and Statistical Approach
The first research question is “Are case process times shorter with CCTV, as
compared to CFS?” To answer this research question, CCTV detections and CFS
were compared across the following process times: queue time, response time,
and total process time (queue time + response time). A common approach to
comparing the numeric distribution of two groups is the independent samples
t-test. However, queue time, response time, and total process time were
found to be significantly nonnormal in both skewness and kurtosis across all
crime categories.12 Since a normal distribution is a key assumption of t-tests
(Morgan, Leech, Gloeckner, & Barrett, 2007), Mann-Whitney U tests were
instead conducted. The Mann-Whitney U test is a nonparametric version of the
t-test that does not assume normality. The dependent variable is treated as
ordinal, with each case (from both the CCTV and CFS) being ordered within a
single distribution from lowest value to highest value. The mean rank (rather
than the mean value) of each category is reported and subjected to signifi-
cance testing (Morgan et al., 2007, p. 147, 148).
11. The Newark Police Department separates CAD assignment codes (generated by call takers and
CCTV operators following the report/detection of an incident) into eight priority levels. Priority
levels one, two, and three primarily include motor vehicle violations, previously occurring incidents
of property crime (e.g. theft report), events necessitating police presence for the purpose of
crowd control (e.g. labor strike), and low-level disorderly behavior (e.g. urinating in public). Inci-
dents with such priority codes collectively encompass the “low-priority” category. Priority levels
four and five include in-progress property crime (e.g. stripping auto in progress), violent crime
(e.g. robbery), and more serious incidents of disorder (e.g. drug activity), and are considered
“intermediate-priority incidents.” The “high-priority incidents” will include CAD levels six and
seven, which mostly includes in-progress gun violence (e.g. “shooting in progress” and “shots
fired”) and other incidents that have the potential to result in bodily injury (e.g. “assault in pro-
gress” or “burglary in-progress while resident is home”). Priority 8 is the highest priority level and
includes severe incidents such as disasters (e.g. “building collapse” or “air crash”), violence
towards public officials (e.g. dignitary attack), or officer assistance (e.g. “assist officer” or “mutual
aid to outside agency”). Such incidents are rare and have little bearing on this study. Activity
reports from November 2007 through December 2010 contained only 58 (0.2%) priority 8 incidents,
all of which were either “assist officer” or “assist EMS” calls. These incidents were excluded based
on the aforementioned “incident type” criteria, which does not compromise the validity of the
analysis.
12. Due to space constraints, the results of the normality tests are not presented, but are available
from the lead author upon request.










































The second research question is “Does CCTV produce a heightened level of
enforcement than CFS?” The risk of offending is rarely (or never) completely
absent. Offenders almost always face the possibility (however small) of being
observed and reported to the police. For CCTV to represent a heightened level
of risk to offenders, CCTV detections should more often lead to police enforce-
ment actions than calls for service. Fisher’s exact tests were conducted to
compare the case closure of CCTV incidents and CFS across three categories of
enforcement actions: arrests, other enforcement, and any enforcement rate
(arrests and “other”).
The third research question is “How often did surveillance activity occur over
the study period?” Case closure of incidents is only one determining factor of
punishment certainty. It is also necessary for CCTV activity to occur on a fairly
frequent basis for the increased certainty of punishment to be communicated
to offenders. If CCTV activity rarely occurs, potential offenders will most likely
not perceive CCTV’s enhanced ability to deliver punishment. A series of ANOVA
models compared the average weekly detections and enforcement actions for
the overall study period, as well as across the five camera installation phases.
The ANOVA tests allowed for the assessment of the overall surveillance activity,
as well as the linear trend of detections and enforcement actions.
The fourth and final research question is “What effect did various surveil-
lance barriers have on the linear trend of the surveillance activity?” A series of
negative binomial regression models13 were conducted in order to identify fac-
tors that influenced the weekly occurrence of CCTV detections and enforce-
ment actions. In the first model, the number of weekly detections served as
the dependent variable. The number of weekly enforcement actions (arrests or
“other”) was the dependent variable in the second model. The units of analysis
were the 165weeks (spanning from Sunday through Saturday) from November
2007 through December 2010. The independent variables represented potential
“surveillance barriers” operating in Newark: the installation phase of the cam-
era program (an ordinal variable from 1 to 5); the four-week average of the
footage requests made to the surveillance unit during the month;14 a dichoto-
mous variable identifying whether the gunshot detection system was installed
yet (1) or not (0); a dichotomous variable identifying if the week was after the
November 2010 layoffs (1) or not (0); and a dichotomous variable identifying if
the week was in the year 2010 (1) or not (0). Two additional covariates were
13. w2 goodness-of-fit tests conducted after exploratory Poisson regression models measured the dis-
tribution of the data. The findings revealed that the weekly count of detections and enforcement
actions were both distributed as negative binomial processes. For detections: Pearson w2 = 554.31
with df = 157; p = 0.00. For enforcement actions: Pearson w2 = 445.74 with df = 157; p = 0.00.
14. Data on footage requests were only available for monthly periods. In order to incorporate this
data with weeks as units of analysis, the four-week average of each monthly count was taken. For
example, if 20 footage requests occurred during a calendar month the weekly average was denoted
as 5 (20/4 = 5). For weeks spanning more than 1month (e.g. a week that begins the last week of
January and ends the first week of February), the requests for the two months was summed
together and then divided by 8. For example, if 20 requests were received in January and 15 in
February, the weekly average would be 4.5 ([20 + 15]/8 = 4.5).










































included as controls for features of weather that may influence street-level
activity and, consequently, the amount of surveillance activity. We would
expect higher amounts of street-level activity to occur during warmer weather
and when there is no precipitation (e.g. rain or snow). Therefore, the average
daily high temperature for each week (Temperature) and the days with either
rain or snow (Precipitation) were calculated for each week.15
Findings
Research Question 1: Are Case Process Times Shorter with CCTV?
For research question 1, a series of Mann-Whitney U tests compared the pro-
cess times of CCTV and CFS across the eight incident categories. Since multiple
tests were conducted (e.g. one for each category) a Holm-Bonferroni correc-
tion was applied to the obtained p values in order to protect against Type I
error (Holm, 1979).16 While common in other disciplines (Belkap, 1992; Olejnik
et al., 1997; Rice, 1989) such procedures are rare in criminology (see Ratcliffe,
Groff, & Fingerhut, 2011 for a noteworthy exception).
Table 2 displays the results of the Mann-Whitney U tests for queue minutes
and response minutes. For overall incidents, CFS had significantly shorter time
intervals than CCTV incidents. When measuring differences across crime types,
CCTV incidents displayed significantly shorter queue times for both drug and
disorder offenses. In respect to the response time for drug and disorder
offenses, CFS displayed significantly shorter time intervals. In respect to prior-
ity levels, CFS had significantly shorter queue times for high-priority incidents
and response times for high- and intermediate-priority incidents. CCTV had sig-
nificantly shorter queue times for low-priority incidents.
The findings regarding queue times were as expected. As previously dis-
cussed, NPD policy upgrades the priority level of CCTV incidents. It was thus not
surprising to find that drug and disorder offenses observed on CCTV spent less
time in the calls pending queue than their CFS counterparts. In fact, we were
surprised that the differences between CCTV and CFS in respect to violence and
the “other crime” categories did not achieve statistical significance. The
15. This data were compiled from the Weather Underground website: www.wunderground.com/
history
16. The traditional procedure for controlling for multiple statistical comparisons is the Bonferroni
method, where each obtained p value is multiplied by the number of tests performed and then
compared to the target p value (e.g. .05) (Belkap, 1992). While this simple application is appeal-
ing, the Bonferroni method is considered an overly conservative estimate (Miller, 1981), and has
the serious disadvantage of having low statistical power (Rice, 1989). While the Bonferroni method
reduces the risk of committing a Type I error, it increases the risk of committing a Type II error
(Olejnik, Li, Supattathum, & Huberty, 1997). The Holm-Bonferroni method maintains statistical
power by establishing different significance levels for rejecting individual hypotheses via the fol-
lowing formula: target p value/(n–i + 1) where n equals the number of tests conducted and i repre-
sents the rank number of the test in terms of degree of significance (Holm, 1979). The Holm
procedure protects against Type I errors but maintains statistical power by sequentially increasing
the criterion of statistical significance (Olejnik et al., 1997, p. 391).





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































findings regarding officer response times, however, were a bit surprising. Patrol
officers do not determine which incidents in the “calls pending queue” they
respond to. This is determined by the police dispatcher, who instructs patrol
officers as to which incidents to address. Therefore, we did not expect the
speed of officer responses to vary by reporting method (CCTV or CFS).
Table 3 presents the results of the Mann-Whitney U tests for total process
minutes, a summation of the queue and response time intervals. Process times
for overall cases were significantly lower in respect to CFS. This was also the
case in respect to high-priority and intermediate-priory incidents. CCTV inci-
dents exhibited significantly lower process times in respect to drug offenses,
disorder offenses, and low-priority incidents.
The cumulative findings of the Mann-Whitney U tests suggests the answer of
research question 1 “Are case process times shorter with CCTV?” to be “No.”
Queue, response, and process times for overall incidents were significantly
shorter for CFS incidents. While CCTV was associated with lower total process
times for low-priority and drug offenses, and queue times for low-priority,
drug, and disorder offenses, CCTV did not consistently demonstrate quicker
process times than CFS.
Research Question 2: Does CCTV Produce a Higher Level of Enforcement
than CFS?
Table 4 displays the results of a series of 2 2 Fisher’s exact tests17 comparing
the arrest rate of CCTV and CFS. The table contains the actual and expected
number of arrests, and also presents the numbers as percentages to represent
the data as “clearance rates.” Similar to the Mann-Whitney U tests, a




Mean rank Mean rank Z p
Overall crime 4864.08 4228.64 8.46 0.000⁄
Violence 1756.24 1867.74 1.34 0.181
Disorder offenses 916.24 1049.14 4.76 0.000⁄
Drug offenses 415.35 610.27 9.87 0.000⁄
Other crime 628.37 652.54 0.82 0.411
High-priority incidents 1734.43 1205.52 12.12 0.000⁄
Intermediate-priority incidents 2355.28 2242.17 2.54 0.020⁄
Low-priority incidents 725.26 827.23 3.34 0.001⁄
⁄Statistically significant after Holm-Bonferroni correction.
17. Fisher’s exact tests were performed instead of Chi-Squared since Chi-Squared is most appropri-
ate when cases are relatively evenly split across categories (Morgan et al., 2007). However,
Chi-Squared and Fisher’s exact tests produced nearly identical results in this study.










































Holm-Bonferroni correction was applied. Despite not being processed quicker
than CFS, CCTV incidents consistently demonstrated higher arrests rates. Dif-
ferences were statistically significant for all crime categories except violence.
Across all the significant categories, CCTV’s observed arrest rate was more
than twice the expected rate. The highest CCTV arrest rates were observed in
respect to drug offenses (20.6%) and high-priority incidents (21.5%). High-prior-
ity incidents were especially impacted by CCTV, with an observed arrest rate
nearly three times the expected rate (7.7%). For all statistically significant cat-
egories, observed arrest rates for CFS were lower than the expected rates.
Table 5 displays the findings for enforcement actions besides arrests.
Differences between CCTV and CFS were statistically significant for overall
crime, drug offenses, high-priority crime, and intermediate-priority crime——all
in favor of CCTV. Overall CCTV incidents exhibited an observed closure rate of
22.2% compared to an expected rate of 14.5%. In respect to the individual
Table 4 Fisher’s exact tests for arrests
Arrest
CCTV CFS
Obs. (Exp.) % Obs. (% Exp.) Obs. (Exp.) % Obs. (% Exp.) p
Overall crime
Yes 152 (71.7) 11.0 (5.2) 268 (348.3) 4.0 (5.2) 0.000⁄
No 1,233 (1313.3) 89.0 (94.8) 6,462 (6381.7) 96.0 (94.8)
Violence
Yes 14 (9) 8.0 (5.1) 177 (182) 5.0 (5.1) 0.080
No 161 (166) 92.0 (94.9) 3,372 (3,367) 95.0 (94.9)
Disorder offenses
Yes 38 (16.9) 6.0 (2.7) 16 (37.1) 1.2 (2.7) 0.000⁄
No 593 (614.1) 94.0 (97.3) 1,367 (1345.9) 98.8 (97.3)
Drug offenses
Yes 80 (41.1) 20.6 (10.6) 34 (72.9) 4.9 (10.5) 0.000⁄
No 309 (347.9) 79.4 (89.4) 657 (618.1) 95.1 (89.5)
Other crime
Yes 20 (8.9) 10.5 (4.7) 41 (52.1) 3.7 (4.7) 0.000⁄
No 170 (181.1) 89.5 (95.3) 1,066 (1054.9) 96.3 (95.3)
High-priority incidents
Yes 65 (23.4) 21.5 (7.7) 119 (160.6) 5.7 (7.7) 0.000⁄
No 238 (279.6) 78.5 (92.3) 1963 (1921.4) 94.3 (92.3)
Intermediate-priority incidents
Yes 75 (41.8) 8.6 (4.8) 130 (163.2) 3.8 (4.8) 0.000⁄
No 801 (834.2) 91.4 (95.2) 3,293 (3259.8) 96.2 (95.2)
Low-priority incidents
Yes 12 (4.5) 5.8 (2.2) 19 (26.5) 1.6 (2.2) 0.001⁄
No 194 (201.5) 94.2 (97.8) 1,206 (1198.5) 98.4 (97.8)
⁄statistically significant after Holm-Bonferroni correction.










































crime categories, intermediate-priority incidents had the highest closure rate
of 28.4%, followed by drug offenses (23.9%) and high-priority incidents (20.8%).
With an observed closure rate more than four times the expected rate (5.1%),
high-priority incidents were particularly susceptible to CCTV effect.
Table 6 displays the results of Fisher’s exact tests with case closure via any
enforcement action (arrest or “other”) as the dependent variable. CCTV inci-
dents experienced significantly higher closure rates than CFS for six of the
eight crime categories: overall crime, disorder offenses, drug offenses, other
crime, high-priority incidents, and intermediate-priority incidents. Drug
offenses and high-priority incidents again displayed much larger than expected
clearance rates. The observed rate for high-priority incidents was more than
three times the expected rate (42.2% vs. 12.9%) while the observed rate for
drug offenses was nearly twice the statistically expected rate (44.5% vs.
29.1%), as identified by the Fisher’s Exact test.
Table 5 Fisher’s exact tests for other enforcement
Other enforcement
CCTV CFS
Obs. (Exp.) % Obs. (% Exp.) Obs. (Exp.) % Obs. (% Exp.) p
Overall crime
Yes 307 (201.4) 22.2 (14.5) 873 (978.6) 13.0 (14.5) 0.000⁄
No 1,078 (1183.6) 77.8 (85.5) 5,857 (5751.4) 87.0 (85.5)
Violence
Yes 18 (14.7) 10.3 (8.4) 294 (297.3) 8.3 (8.4) 0.329
No 157 (160.3) 89.7 (91.6) 3,255 (3251.7) 91.7 (91.6)
Disorder offenses
Yes 166 (162.9) 26.3 (25.8) 354 (357.1) 25.6 (25.8) 0.742
No 465 (468.1) 73.7 (74.2) 1,029 (1025.9) 74.4 (74.2)
Drug offenses
Yes 93 (72) 23.9 (18.5) 107 (128) 15.5 (18.5) 0.001⁄
No 296 (317) 76.1 (81.5) 584 (563) 84.5 (81.5)
Other crime
Yes 30 (21.7) 15.8 (11.4) 118 (126.3) 10.7 (11.4) 0.048
No 160 (168.3) 84.2 (88.6) 989 (980.7) 88.6 (89.3)
High-priority incidents
Yes 63 (15.6) 20.8 (5.1) 60 (107.4) 2.9 (5.2) 0.000⁄
No 240 (287.4) 79.2 (94.9) 2022 (1974.6) 97.1 (94.8)
Intermediate-priority incidents
Yes 193 (138.6) 28.4 (20.4) 683 (737.4) 18.9 (20.4) 0.000⁄
No 487 (541.4) 71.6 (79.6) 2,936 (2881.6) 81.1 (79.6)
Low-priority incidents
Yes 51 (54.3) 24.8 (26.4) 326 (322.7) 26.6 (26.3) 0.609
No 155 (151.7) 75.2 (73.6) 899 (902.3) 73.4 (73.7)
⁄statistically significant after Holm-Bonferroni correction.










































The results of the Fisher’s Exact tests suggest the answer to research ques-
tion 2, “Does CCTV produce a higher level of enforcement than CFS?” to be
“yes.” Across all enforcement types, most incident categories experienced
significantly higher closure rates via CCTV than CFS. CFS did not exhibit higher
closure rates than CCTV in a single instance. These findings support the
assumption that CCTV leads to a higher certainty of punishment than CFS.
Research Question 3: “How Often did Surveillance Activity occur over
the Study Period?”
Table 7 displays the average levels of weekly surveillance activity for the over-
all study period as well as the five camera installation phases. Over the 165
week study period, an average of 10.19 detections and 3.41 enforcement
Table 6 Fisher’s exact tests for overall enforcement
Overall enforcement
CCTV CFS
pObs. (Exp.) % Obs. (% Exp.) Obs. (Exp.) % Obs. (% Exp.)
Overall crime
Yes 459 (273.1) 33.1 (19.7) 1,141 (1326.9) 17.0 (19.7) 0.000⁄
No 926 (1111.9) 66.9 (80.3) 5,589 (5403.1) 83.0 (80.3)
Violence
Yes 32 (23.6) 18.3 (13.5) 471 (479.4) 13.3 (13.5%) 0.069
No 143 (151.4) 81.7 (86.7) 3,078 (3069.6) 86.7 (86.5)
Disorder offenses
Yes 204 (179.8) 32.3 (28.5) 370 (394.2) 26.8 (28.5) 0.011⁄
No 427 (451.2) 67.7 (71.5) 1,013 (988.8) 73.2 (71.5)
Drug offenses
Yes 173 (113.1) 44.5 (29.1) 141 (200.9) 20.4 (29.1) 0.000⁄
No 216 (275.9) 55.5 (70.9) 550 (490.1) 79.6 (70.9)
Other crime
Yes 50 (30.6) 26.3 (16.1) 159 (178.4) 14.4 (16.1) 0.000⁄
No 140 (159.4) 73.7 (83.9) 948 (928.6) 85.6 (83.9)
High-priority incidents
Yes 128 (39) 42.2 (12.9) 179 (268) 8.6 (12.9) 0.000⁄
No 175 (264) 57.8 (87.1) 1903 (1814) 91.4 (87.1)
Intermediate-priority incidents
Yes 268 (180.3) 30.6 (20.6) 617 (704.7) 18.0 (20.6) 0.000⁄
No 608 (695.7) 69.4 (79.4) 2,806 (2718.3) 82.0 (79.4)
Low-priority incidents
Yes 63 (58.7) 30.6 (28.5) 345 (349.3) 28.2 (28.5) 0.505
No 143 (147.3) 69.4 (71.5) 880 (875.7) 71.8 (71.5)
⁄Statistically significant after Holm-Bonferroni correction.










































actions occurred per week. However, weekly activity was not consistent. The
highest levels of activity were evident at the beginning of the CCTV operation.
Figure 1 shows that CCTV detections and enforcement actions both experi-
enced a sharp and steady decline after the initial phases of the program. An
average of 26.84 CCTV detections occurred per week during camera phase 1.
Each subsequent camera phase brought about a reduced amount of detections.
Average weekly detections dropped to a low of 2.11 during phase 5, a number
more than 92% lower than the phase 1 average. A similar pattern was observed
for the enforcement actions. An average of 9.47 enforcement actions occurred
per week during phase 1 and decreased during phase 2 (3.00) and phase 3
(2.93). While enforcement increased by less than 1 incident per week during
phase 4 (3.68), weekly enforcement actions fell to a low of 1.22 during Phase
Table 7 ANOVA results for the average number of weekly detections and enforcement
actions across the camera installation phases
Camera installation phase Weekly activity
Frequency Mean detections Mean enforcement
Overall Study Period 165 10.19 3.41
Phase 1 (11 cameras) 19 26.84 9.47
Phase 2 (60 cameras) 20 12.70 3.00
Phase 3 (111 cameras) 71 9.83 2.93
Phase 4 (136 Cameras) 19 7.53 3.68
Phase 5 (146 cameras) 36 2.11 1.22
F – 51.05 17.01
p – 0.00 0.00
Figure 1 Weekly surveillance detections and enforcement actions.










































5. ANOVA tests confirmed that the observed differences for both detections
and enforcement were statistically significant (p = 0.00).
Research question 3 was “How often did surveillance activity occur over the
study period?” ANOVA tests suggest that while detections and enforcement
occurred frequently during the beginning of the CCTV operation, surveillance
activity became somewhat rare.
Research Question 4: What Effect did Various Surveillance Barriers have
on the Linear Trend of Surveillance Activity?
Table 8 displays the results of the negative binomial models testing the influ-
ence of several covariates on the weekly counts of detections and enforcement
actions. The detections model found camera phase, footage requests, after
layoffs, after gunshot detection, and temperature to be statistically signifi-
cant. “Footage requests” was the only significant variable with a positive inci-
dence rate ratio (IRR) (1.05). Four of the five variables exhibited negative IRR
values. The IRR for “camera phase” suggests that with each installation of a
new wave of cameras weekly detections reduced by approximately 47%.
Similarly, the introduction of the gunshot detection system was associated
with a 29% reduction in weekly detections while the period after layoffs was
associated with an over 86% reduction. Temperature was statistically signifi-
cant, but not in the expected direction. The results show that for every 1
degree increase in the temperature, weekly detections decreased by approxi-
mately 1%. While one may expect more detections to occur in warmer weather
(e.g. when more people are outside) previous research has noted that ground-
level obstructions such as leaves from trees and bushes (which are more promi-
nent in warmer weather) often impede upon an operator’s ability to monitor
Table 8 Negative binomial results for weekly surveillance detections and surveillance
enforcement actions: IRRs





Lower Upper Lower Upper
Camera phase 0.53⁄⁄ 0.52 0.44 0.64 0.53⁄⁄ 0.08 0.40 0.71
Footage requests 1.05⁄⁄ 0.02 1.01 1.09 1.04 0.03 0.98 1.10
After gunshot detection 0.71⁄ 0.12 0.51 0.98 0.74 0.19 0.44 1.24
After layoffs 0.13⁄⁄ 0.10 0.03 0.60 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Year 2010 1.36 0.29 0.904 2.05 2.42⁄⁄ 0.76 1.30 4.48
Temperature 0.99⁄⁄ 0.00 0.98 0.99 0.99⁄⁄ 0.04 0.98 0.10
Precipitation 1.01 0.03 0.95 1.07 0.97 0.05 0.88 1.07
⁄p<0.05; ⁄⁄p<0.01.










































CCTV areas (Gill, Rose, Collins, & Hemming, 2006; Smith, 2004). Such a situa-
tion may have also presented hardships to CCTV operators in Newark. Further-
more, with fewer people outside during winter weather months (when leaves
are absent), it may be easier for camera operators to focus on individuals
engaged in criminal activity who are no longer “lost” in a sea of many people
on the city streets.
Fewer variables achieved statistical significance in the enforcement model.
Camera phase, year 2010, and temperature were all statistically significant.
Camera phase (IRR = 0.53) and temperature (IRR = 0.98) were associated with
enforcement decreases. The “year 2010” findings were somewhat surprising,
with that variable being associated with a doubling of weekly enforcement lev-
els. The variable was insignificant in the detections models, meaning that year
2010 impacted the result of camera detections (e.g. enforcement) without
impacting the level of detections themselves. Furthermore, year 2010 was con-
ceptualized as the period when the police department was shifting resources
in preparation for the impending police layoffs; it was thus unexpected for the
“year 2010” and “after layoffs” variables to be correlated with enforcement in
opposite directions. Newark Police officials provided a potential explanation
for this seemingly counterintuitive observation. A main concern of the Newark
Police Department was maintaining adequate levels of officers on the street
after the layoffs. Therefore, a number of officers in administrative posts were
reassigned to patrol duties throughout 2010 in order to prepare them to take
over for the street officers who were slated for termination. While this was
done in anticipation of the layoffs, the immediate effect was an increased
number of officers patrolling the streets of Newark; the “replacements” were
on the street along with the officers currently assigned to patrol (who would
later be terminated). Newark police officials suggested that this increase in
street-level personnel may have enhanced the department’s ability to respond
to CCTV detections, leading to higher levels of enforcement actions.
The findings regarding footage requests being associated with higher levels
of detections should be taken with a grain of salt. Since a disk of footage was
created each time an enforcement action resulted from a CCTV detection, the
correlation between footage requests and surveillance activity may be some-
what artificial. While excluding the disks burned for evidentiary purposes
would have been beneficial, the data were not disaggregated in such a man-
ner. This limited the model to incorporating the footage request category in
its entirety.
In light of the ambiguity of “footage requests,” two additional models were
run excluding this variable (see Table 9). This was done as an additional test
of the covariate influence, particularly by testing which covariates maintained
significance absent the footage requests. In both the detections and enforce-
ment models, camera phase, after layoffs, and temperature all maintained
statistical significance with similar IRR values as the previous model. In the
updated detections model, after gunshot detections was no longer statistically
significant.










































The third research question was “What effect did various surveillance barri-
ers have on the steady reduction of surveillance activity?” Results suggest that
the expansion of the camera system (e.g. the “camera phase” variable) and
the police layoffs significantly contributed to the downward trend in CCTV
detections. In respect to enforcement, results suggest that while “year 2010”
provided a temporary increase to the weekly number of enforcement actions,
the ensuing police layoffs resulted in a significant decrease in the weekly
enforcement actions.
Discussion of Results
Findings of this study have significant policy implications for CCTV use by law
enforcement. Despite having relatively similar process times, CCTV detections
led to enforcement actions against suspects much more often that CFS for five
of the seven incident categories included in the analysis. When enforcement is
restricted to arrests, violence was the only category to not achieve statistical
significance. This may be due to the fact that surveillance cameras may alert
police to pertinent factors of street crime not typically captured by CFS or
officers on the street. Norris and Armstrong (1999a) discuss such advantages
provided by CCTV:
Because the “presence” of [CCTV] operatives is remote and unobtrusive,
there is less likelihood that people will orient their behavior in the knowl-
edge that they are being watched, and, by virtue of the elevated position
and telescopic capacity of the camera, operators have a greater range of
vision than the street-level police officer. (p. 159)
For example, the primary author once heard the following radio exchange
between a Lieutenant of Newark’s Narcotics Division (who was monitoring
cameras) and undercover officers in the field:
Table 9 Negative binomial results for weekly surveillance detections and surveillance







Lower Upper Lower Upper
Camera phase 0.64⁄⁄ 0.44 0.55 0.73 0.61⁄⁄ 0.06 0.50 0.75
After gunshot detection 0.75 0.12 0.54 1.04 0.78 0.20 0.47 1.30
After layoffs 0.11⁄⁄ 0.09 0.03 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Year 2010 1.18 0.24 0.79 1.75 2.16⁄ 0.66 1.19 3.93
Temperature 0.99⁄⁄ 0.00 0.98 0.99 0.99⁄⁄ 0.00 0.98 0.10
Precipitation 1.02 0.03 0.95 1.08 0.98 0.05 0.89 1.08
⁄p<0.05; ⁄⁄p<0.01










































The guys I saw selling on [street name] yesterday are now on [street name
#2]. They just served [sold drugs to] a guy in a white Lexus. The kid who
made the actual transaction is wearing a turquoise t-shirt. The other 2 deal-
ers are on [street name #3]: [one is wearing a] red shirt, hat and a beard;
the other one has a white t-shirt and thinner beard … they keep walking to
the back of the building; I think that’s where the stash [of drugs] is.
As the quote illustrates, CCTV footage provided field officers with insight into
a number of factors——such as drug stash location and additional sus-
pects——which may have been difficult for the officers to observe on their
own.
Unfortunately, the increased effectiveness of the cameras was negated by
the fact that CCTV detections and, by extension, enforcement became rare
occurrences as the system expanded. It is hard to argue that offender “risk
perceptions” could have been affected in light of such rare enforcement. The
“camera phase” and “after layoffs” variables were most associated with lower
levels of detections and enforcement. These findings suggest that the Newark
Police may have suffered from expanding the CCTV system absent a plan to
maintain early levels of surveillance activity. This may be symptomatic of
“technological determinism,” a term defined by Norris and Armstrong (1999a)
as “an unquestioning belief in the power of technology” (p. 9). As argued by
Pease (1999)
Crime reduction has been bedeviled by the tendency to polarize measures
into those which will be helpful in all circumstances and those which
will not be helpful in any … (CCTV) has sadly fallen into the first category.
(p. 48)
Such blind faith has led many agencies to deploy CCTV as a “stand-alone” tac-
tic, overlooking important strategic considerations, such as operational focus
and manpower (La Vigne et al., 2011).
These findings also dispute the commonly held notion of CCTV as a “force
multiplier.” A perceived benefit of CCTV cameras is that they provide addi-
tional “eyes on the street” that increase police presence. For example, Norris
(2003) attributed the following statement to a public official who championed
CCTV use against crime: “CCTV is a wonderful technological supplement to the
police … One police officer likened the 20-camera system as having 20 officers
on duty, 24-h a day constantly taking notes” (p. 254). Such statements fail to
realize that the human component of CCTV is what makes observation possi-
ble. While the cameras record footage of the target areas, a human operator
is needed to review said footage for investigatory purposes (e.g. taking notes),
or to discover infractions in real time. Therefore, increased resources towards
“human aspects” of surveillance may be necessary to ensure maximum effi-
ciency of CCTV. Unfortunately, little consideration has typically been given to
the human factors of CCTV, with aspects such as the camera-to-operator ratio,
lack of criminal intelligence afforded to operators, and methods of communi-










































cation between operators and field officers being overlooked by practitioners
(Keval & Sasse, 2010).
A seemingly obvious solution would be for police departments to provide
maximum staffing for their surveillance units to keep the camera-to-operator
ratio as low as possible. Despite the likely benefits this would generate——in
respect to increased detections and enforcement——the current fiscal situation
of many police agencies likely precludes the possibility of dedicating additional
resources to surveillance. A more realistic option may be for police to incorpo-
rate CCTV cameras into current proactive operations of their agency. In Balti-
more, for example, surveillance operators routinely worked in conjunction
with officers from the narcotics and bicycle patrol units, specifically by moni-
toring cameras in areas patrolled by these units and directly alerting the offi-
cers via two-way radio when an incident was observed (La Vigne et al., 2011).
Such a policy can maximize CCTV functionality by enabling operators to detect
incidents of concern that may have gone unobserved had they been tasked
with monitoring all of the system’s cameras for the entirety of their shift.
Focusing on the cameras in specific target areas essentially lowers the camera-
to-operator ratio, allowing operators to focus their attention on specific crimi-
nogenic environments. Such strategies are consistent with evidence-based
practices, such as hot spots policing, which have demonstrated that the con-
centration of police resources amongst a few problematic targets more suffi-
ciently addresses crime than the even distribution of resources across space
(Braga, Papachristos, & Hureau, 2012). Furthermore, by having proactive units
at their disposal, operators can immediately dispatch officers when they
observe a crime, which can help increase the perceived certainty of punish-
ment.
The introduction of technologies like gunshot-flash recognition and video
analytics are increasingly becoming integrated with CCTV in an attempt to
“ensure a more efficient and effective crime-fighting tool” (La Vigne et al.,
2011, p. 23). Since operators cannot simultaneously monitor all cameras in a
system, such technology may better focus operator attention by identifying
precisely when an operator should monitor a specific camera. However, the
issue of cost effectiveness should be considered before implementing such
technologies. For example, research has shown that the cost-saving benefits of
CCTV (in respect to crime occurrence and merchandise shrinkage) is slim, with
certain studies suggesting that CCTV needs to be in place upwards of a decade
before recouping the capital cost (Beck & Willis, 1999; Sasse, 2010). Since
complimentary technology adds additional expenses to CCTV systems, practi-
tioners should consider whether funds may be better allocated towards on-the-
ground police tactics with established records of success (e.g. Braga et al.,
2012; Braga & Weisburd, 2012; Weisburd, Telep, Hinkle, & Eck, 2010), in lieu
of such technology. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that such technology
will indeed increase CCTV effectiveness, as illustrated in the current study.
Findings of the initial negative binomial regression models (see Table 8) sug-
gest that the introduction of the gunshot detection system led to a decreased










































level of CCTV detections, and while the variable lost statistical significance in
the updated model (see Table 9), it was not associated with increased CCTV
activity in any of the models.
Findings of this study suggest that cities should design their CCTV systems in
a manner that allows for maximum proactive activity. Police should ensure
that they have the capacity to actively monitor cameras and swiftly respond to
any incidents observed by the operators, an approach advocated elsewhere
(see Ratcliffe, 2006, p. 20). Officials should also be mindful of this fact when
deciding to expand their existing systems. While positive effects may be expe-
rienced in the initial stages of a CCTV system (e.g. when there are fewer cam-
eras), these effects may not be sustainable as the system expands. This is
especially true if additional personnel are not able to be allocated to either
the monitoring or response functions of the CCTV operation. While financial
and organization commitments are considered necessary factors in the sustain-
ability of technological approaches to crime prevention (Cameron et al.,
2008), this study presented a paradoxical situation where fiscal commitment
may have compromised sustainability. While CCTV may also provide police
investigatory benefits (La Vigne et al., 2011; Ratcliffe, 2006) and reduce fear
of crime (Cordner, 2010, p. 51) the explicit goal of police agencies is often the
detection and prevention of street-level crime. The expansion of existing sys-
tems may require agencies to re-consider their CCTV strategy and mission over
time.
Conclusion
While previous research has predominately measured the effect of CCTV (e.g.
deterrence) this current study focused on relevant process-related factors of
surveillance, which likely relate to CCTV’s ability to deter crime. However,
this study, like most others, has specific limitations that should be mentioned.
For one, the control group was limited to CFS occurring within CCTV areas. On
the one hand, exclusively including CFS from CCTV areas controls for the envi-
ronment; since the geography is identical for both the treatment and control
group, differences cannot be attributed to the disproportionate influence of
criminogenic features (e.g. crime attractors or generators) on either group.
However, CFS occurring outside of CCTV areas are completely unrelated to
CCTV, and thus may have been a more appropriate comparison and something
to consider for future research.
Additional limitations relate to the covariates utilized in the negative bino-
mial regression models. In addition to the previously discussed issue of our
inability to disaggregate the “footage requests” variable, the data did not
allow for identification of the precise days that the surveillance unit was below
full strength. The dichotomous “after layoffs” and “year 2010” variables were
included as proxy measures for when CCTV operators were most likely to be
temporarily assigned to other assignments. The models may have improved










































had the data included precise dates that less than two operators were on duty.
Furthermore, there may have been other potential surveillance barriers not
accounted for in our model, such as inadequate training (Gill et al., 2005) and
low motivation (Norris & McCahill, 2006) of surveillance personnel. While this
would likely be relatively consistent across all data for this study, since CCTV
operators in Newark have similar levels of training, it is something to consider
in future research.
Despite these limitations, this study makes significant contributions to the
literature. The findings confirm that CCTV cameras, on a case-by-case basis,
increase the certainty of punishment over CFS, an assumption that has previ-
ously been left implicit. The findings also caution against expanding CCTV sys-
tems to the point where police are unable to adequately monitor the totality
of cameras. While CCTV-reported incidents more often led to enforcement
than CFS, their infrequent occurrence likely minimized the effect of the
enforcement. In light of these findings, it is prudent for police to carefully
consider agency resources, such as personnel levels, before substantially
investing in CCTV systems.
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